Updated on
October 5, 2026
Kohlberg's 6 Stages of Moral Development, With Examples
Kohlberg's six stages of moral development with real-life examples, how each stage answers the Heinz dilemma, a dilemma discussion planner and the evidence.

Updated on
October 5, 2026
Kohlberg's six stages of moral development with real-life examples, how each stage answers the Heinz dilemma, a dilemma discussion planner and the evidence.
What are Kohlberg's stages of moral development?
The model of Kohlberg's stages of moral development describes six kinds of moral reasoning within three levels: preconventional, conventional and postconventional. It examines why someone judges an action right or wrong. Stages concern reasons, rather than choices. They are neither fixed age bands nor measures of a person's moral worth.
Revision questions often give you an action and ask which stage it shows. The clue is the reason behind the action. In a classroom discussion, too, two learners may make the same choice for different reasons. This guide helps you tell those reasons apart, then weigh the research behind the model.
Lawrence Kohlberg first presented his model in a 1958 doctoral thesis. He used dilemma interviews to examine moral judgement, including the reasons people gave in response to the Heinz story (Kohlberg, 1981). Two learners can both return a lost wallet. One fears punishment, while the other is concerned about its owner.
Start with the six stages, their origins and the Heinz dilemma. Then compare Kohlberg with Piaget and Gilligan, examine the criticisms and check your understanding with the quiz. Kohlberg sits within the wider major learning theories about how children develop.
Key takeaways
On this page
Each stage is a way of explaining why something is right. Each one also takes in more people's points of view than the stage before it.
| Claim |
|---|
| The stages differ in kind, rather than just in how many reasons a person gives. |
| Later reasoning brings earlier concerns into a wider view, called hierarchical integration. |
| Development follows an invariant sequence, meaning that the proposed order stays the same. |
| Universality means that this sequence applies across cultures. |
| These are claims for research to test (Rest et al., 1999a). |
Lawrence Kohlberg (1927 to 1987) was an American psychologist who worked at the University of Chicago and later at Harvard. He took Jean Piaget's idea that children's thinking develops in stages and applied it to moral judgement. He then followed it into the teenage years and adult life.
The key distinction is between an action and the reason for it. One learner follows a rule because they fear a sanction. Another seeks approval, while a third thinks the rule protects people. Their behaviour looks the same. Their reasons reveal different views of what makes an act right.
Kohlberg saw development as a move towards reasons that take in more people and more general principles. He proposed an ordered sequence. Other child development theories place moral reasoning beside changes in thought, relationships and emotions. Erikson's psychosocial stages, for example, describe the identity questions that often sit alongside moral ones in adolescence.
Kohlberg's first study, for his 1958 doctoral thesis, interviewed 72 boys from Chicago aged 10, 13 and 16 about dilemmas like Heinz. He sorted their reasons into the six stages (Kohlberg, 1963). The sample was all male and all American, which later fed the criticisms below.
Kohlberg and his colleagues then followed a sample of 58 boys, reinterviewing them every three or four years for 20 years (Colby et al., 1983). Their reasoning moved through the stages in order. Almost nobody skipped a stage or moved back beyond what measurement error would explain. But only a minority reached stage 5, and only as adults. Stage 6 did not show up clearly, so it was dropped from the scoring manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
Kohlberg first presented his theory in his 1958 doctoral thesis and published an early account in 1963. He later set out its philosophy and psychology in books published in 1981 and 1984.
| Year | Work | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| 1958 | Doctoral thesis | The early dilemma interviews supplied the basis for the stages. |
| 1963 | Early research article | Kohlberg described the sequence of moral thought. |
| 1981 | The Philosophy of Moral Development | The case for justice and ethical principles. |
| 1984 | The Psychology of Moral Development | The developmental theory, evidence and responses to criticism. |
For Kohlberg's ethical arguments, read The Philosophy of Moral Development (1981). For his theory of development and its research base, read The Psychology of Moral Development (1984).
These form the two volumes of Essays on Moral Development. The references below also include the long-term study and later tests of the model. Use those studies to check a claim about stages against research.
The long-term design followed the same people through repeated interviews. This supports a stronger test of the order of change than a comparison between unrelated age groups (Colby et al., 1983). The important finding was an ordered pattern in the participants' reasoning across time.
The first study involved only boys, which limits claims about other groups. Later research needs to test whether the scoring and sequence apply across genders, cultures and social settings. A pattern in an interview is evidence about moral judgement, rather than a complete account of moral life or behaviour.
The six stages form three levels, with two stages in each. At the first level, reasons are about what happens to me. At the second, they are about the people and rules around me. At the third, they are about rights and principles that should hold for everyone. The diagram below shows what "right" means at each stage.
Read the diagram from top to bottom to compare the kinds of reason. Kohlberg proposed this order of development. People reach different points, and the ages section below explains the broad trends.
Instrumental purpose and exchange is another name for stage 2. Instrumental means that an action serves a purpose, such as securing a benefit. Exchange means that each person expects something in return. This differs from stage 3, where approval and the relationship itself become central.
Stage 3 is also called interpersonal concordance, meaning agreement with the expectations of people whose approval matters. Stage 4 shifts towards the social system: the reason refers to institutions and duties, even when close friends would prefer an exception. Both belong to conventional reasoning.
A social contract is a shared agreement about how society should work. Its authority rests on protecting people's rights and welfare. This distinguishes stage 5 from stage 4: the person evaluates the social system against its purpose, rather than treating its continued operation as the main justification.
Kohlberg's age patterns are broad trends. Early reasons often focus on punishment and rewards. Reasons about approval, rules and shared duties become more common through adolescence and adult life.
His first sample included boys aged 10, 13 and 16. The 20-year follow-up traced change into adulthood (Colby et al., 1983). A separate life-span study also found development continuing in adult life (Armon & Dawson, 1997).
Postconventional reasoning appeared in only seven of the 44 adults in that study. This gives a clearer picture than a fixed birthday for each stage. Age describes the sample; the reason given is what the method scores.
Examples help most when they show a reason, not just an action. Here is one everyday example and one school example for each stage. Notice that the same action could come from a different stage if the reason changed.

The Heinz dilemma is the best known of Kohlberg's stories. A woman is dying of a rare cancer, and a chemist in her town has found a drug that might save her. It cost him $200 to make, but he charges $2,000.
Her husband, Heinz, borrows all he can but raises only $1,000, and the chemist refuses to lower the price or let him pay later. So Heinz breaks into the shop and steals the drug. Should he have done it? (Kohlberg, 1963)

Kohlberg scored the reason for the answer. Every stage can argue for stealing and every stage can argue against it, as the comparison below shows.
Look at stage 1 and stage 4 on the "should not steal" side. Both say no, but one fears prison and the other worries about the law for everyone. The choices match, while the reasons differ. That is the whole idea of the dilemma.
Researchers measure moral reasoning by examining the reasons people give for choices in dilemmas. They use a probing interview or a test that asks people to rate and rank possible reasons.
| Method | What it asks and reveals |
|---|---|
| Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview | asks for a choice, a reason and answers to follow-up questions. Would the reason still hold if Heinz were helping a stranger? Scoring draws on the whole interview and a trained scorer's use of a manual (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). |
| Rest's Defining Issues Test, or DIT, | presents dilemmas with possible reasons. Readers rate and rank which reasons matter most. It tests which ideas they recognise and favour, while an interview asks them to produce their own account (Rest et al., 1999a). |
These methods sample reasoning in different ways. A short classroom answer gives a starting point for discussion. A research score needs the full procedure, rather than a quick match between one sentence and a stage name.
The Heinz dilemma also appears in revision notes and online debate. The posts below show four common ways to read it. Compare each claim with the difference between an action and its reason.
Four short posts from people who met the Heinz dilemma, or a dilemma like it, in class, in revision or in their own reading. Each offers a claim to test against the theory.
studied Heinz Dilemma in my psych class this past summer . it's OUTSTANDING the amount of bootlickers in the world.
It basically teaches: Heinz should steal the drug and not face consequences because that wouldn’t be fair.
S4: Law and Order = Only follows law because it's the law.
my prof presented the trolley dilemma in class today & someone asked if they’d be liable for pulling the lever
Each post turns a question about reasons into a verdict or a slogan. One reader decides the theory tells Heinz to steal. A revision note shrinks stage 4 to "because it's the law". Another focuses on the risk of getting in trouble. For revision, identify the reason being used and the part of the theory the claim leaves out.
Kohlberg believed reasoning develops as people learn to take in more points of view. First a child weighs their own interests against another person's, and later the expectations of groups and institutions. At the postconventional level, they judge those institutions against rights and principles.
A new point of view can challenge an existing reason. Kohlberg called this tension disequilibrium. A person then tries to build a view that fits the new concern as well as the old one. Restoring that fit is equilibration (Kohlberg, 1984). The proposed process helps explain why dialogue mattered to the theory.
Language also shapes what an interview reveals. A person may have a thoughtful moral concern but struggle to put it into words. Familiarity with the story and time to think can affect the answer. Sociocultural theory offers a wider account of the role of language and talk.
A moral interview measures judgement. What a person actually does also depends on emotion, empathy, habits, friendships, risk and the moment itself. Knowing why something is fair does not give a learner the courage to do it. And a child may act kindly out of care or habit without being able to explain why.
Blasi (1980) reviewed the early studies of reasoning and behaviour. A later meta-analysis of 151 studies found a real but limited link (Villegas de Posada & Vargas-Trujillo, 2015). Higher reasoning went with more helpful, honest and independent behaviour, but the links were small to moderate. Other theories fill the gap. Social learning theory, for example, shows how children copy the behaviour they see modelled around them.
Critics question rigid stages, cultural fit and the place of care. They also question the gap between moral judgement and behaviour.
Rest's schemas are overlapping sets of ideas: personal interest, maintaining norms and postconventional reasoning. Development shifts their relative importance (Rest et al., 1999a). Answers can mix concerns, rather than fitting one fixed pattern.
Holstein (1976) followed 52 adolescents and their parents to test the order of the stages. Walker (1989) found few breaks in the sequence. Dawson (2002) supported ordered change but found a stage between 3 and 4. A lower score needs careful interpretation.
Snarey (1985) reviewed 45 studies in 27 countries and found broad support, though postconventional reasoning appeared mainly in urban, middle-class groups. Gibbs et al. (2007) added 75 studies in 23 countries and supported a broad stage trend. The scoring's cultural fit remains disputed.
| Concern | Focus |
|---|---|
| Autonomy | centres on rights and individual welfare. |
| Community | centres on duty and shared life. |
| Divinity | centres on sacred values and purity. |
Gilligan (1982) challenged the justice focus and weight given to care. Walker (1984) found no consistent sex difference in stage scores. Jaffee and Hyde (2000) found small care and justice differences. Thoma (1986) found slightly higher Defining Issues Test scores among females.
Both sexes used both orientations. Jorgensen (2006) reads the theories as a dialogue.
Haidt's social intuitionist model proposes that quick feelings often precede reasons (Haidt, 2001). Social contact can shape those feelings. This challenges an account in which a reason leads straight to a judgement.
Turiel distinguishes harm and fairness, social conventions and personal choices (Turiel, 1983). These domains can overlap in a dispute. They offer alternatives to one developmental ladder.
| Example | Domain |
|---|---|
| Hurting someone | raises a moral concern. |
| A dress code | is a social convention. |
| A choice of hobby | is usually personal. |
Stage scores address judgement, rather than empathy, courage or behaviour. A principled answer may still give way to peer pressure.
Restorative practices and character education address wider moral life. They are not direct tests of the stages.
Rest's four components link judgement with other processes of action (Rest et al., 1999b). They are processes, rather than extra developmental stages.
Moral identity means how central being moral is to someone's sense of self. It concerns commitment as well as judgement.
The standard model has six stages. Kohlberg's provisional seventh, a cosmic orientation, explored meaning and moral commitment (Kohlberg and Power, 1981, reprinted in Kohlberg, 1981). It was not established by the six-stage interview research. In an exam, give three levels and six stages unless later speculation is requested.
Kohlberg built on Piaget and took the stages into adult life. Gilligan challenged the weight he gave to justice. The three are connected, but they ask different questions.
| Account | Main focus | Useful comparison point |
|---|---|---|
| Piaget | How children come to understand rules and fairness. | The starting point for Kohlberg's developmental approach. |
| Kohlberg | How reasons develop across three levels and six stages. | Justice, shared duties, rights and ethical principles. |
| Gilligan | Care, responsibility and relationships. | A wider moral voice than a justice-only account. |
Piaget studied how children's thinking changes as they build knowledge and learn to see other points of view. His own work on moral judgement described two broad stages in childhood. Kohlberg kept the idea that moral judgement has a developmental structure, and turned it into six stages based on answers to dilemmas. For the wider account of thinking, read Piaget's theory of cognitive development.
Both theories concern changes in thought. Experience, opportunity and the demands of a task all matter. Our guide to Piaget and Vygotsky compared covers their wider views of learning.
Kohlberg organised moral reasoning around wider and wider ideas of justice, law, rights and principle. Gilligan drew attention to care, connection and need. These can be two concerns inside one person's thinking, not two moralities split by sex.
For a comparison answer, state what each account brings into focus. Kohlberg asks how a judgement can be justified through duties, rights and principles. Gilligan asks how care and responsibility shape a response to the needs of people in relationships. The concerns can appear together in one answer.
For the theories that sit around Kohlberg, see our learning theories collection. The classroom section below shows one way to use the contrasts in a discussion.
Kohlberg's theory is most useful as a way to plan discussion, not as a test for sorting learners. Present a real dilemma, give thinking time, ask for reasons and compare points of view. Then let learners look again at their first answer. The aim is better reasons, better listening and honest reflection.
The Heinz story is memorable, but illness, death and theft can upset some learners. You can explore the same contrast in reasons with everyday situations that carry less risk.
A learner finds an unnamed wallet. A group must share credit when some did more work. Someone sees an unkind post in a class chat. A school rule makes things harder for a few learners.
A good dilemma has a real tension. If one option is plainly kind and the other plainly cruel, learners just guess the answer you want. A useful dilemma sets two good things against each other, such as loyalty and safety, equal shares and need, or a fair rule and a fair exception.
Then ask, "What makes that the fairest choice?" or "Would your reason still work if the people changed?" Questions like these bring the reason into the open.
This routine builds oracy and critical thinking, because learners have to say, test and improve their reasons. Pairs can rehearse first, so the class compares reasons rather than personalities.
Stems such as "My view depends on..." and "Another way to see it is..." help. Socratic questioning gives you more ways to press on a reason without giving away your own view.
The planner below turns the routine into a lesson card. Pick a key stage and a theme. It gives you a dilemma for that age group, an opening task and five probe questions. Four prompts explore the three levels of reasoning. The fifth asks about care, drawing on Gilligan's critique.
Use the probe questions in any order. The point is to compare reasons and test what each one takes into account. The planner offers prompts for discussion rather than a test of anyone's stage.
Kohlberg's own team tested classroom discussion early on. Moshe Blatt led twelve hours of dilemma discussion over twelve weeks. Children in these classes tended to move towards higher levels of reasoning than children in control classes (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975).
The proposed mechanism was cognitive conflict: hearing a more complex reason could lead a learner to rethink their own. The often-cited rule was to present reasoning one stage above. Walker found that exposure two stages above also led to development (Walker, 1982). This questions a strict rule about the distance between stages.
A review of 55 later studies found that dilemma discussion programmes led to modest gains in moral judgement scores. Programmes of about three to twelve weeks worked best, and gains were larger for adults than for school-age groups (Schlaefli et al., 1985). In a recent randomised trial with 704 Swiss children aged about 10, small-group talk about stories improved the quality of their discussions. Their own written reasons also improved (Gasser et al., 2026).
So the honest claim is modest. Regular, well-run dilemma talk can help learners give fuller reasons. It does not show that one lesson moves a child up a stage. A small trial with five and six year olds found better decisions but no change in stage (Hsieh & Wu, 2026). A study of Hong Kong primary teachers found three useful question moves: "what if" questions, asking learners to swap roles and playing devil's advocate (Wong, 2021).
Kohlberg later went further than lessons. In his "just community" schools, learners and staff made and enforced the school's rules together in democratic meetings (Power et al., 1989). Today, Philosophy for Children uses a similar mix of shared questions, reasons and respect.
Listen for what a learner brings into the conversation. Do they talk only about punishment, or also about intentions, friendships, what a rule is for and the rights of people with less power? Notice whether they apply a reason the same way twice and whether they can answer a counterexample.
Never say, "You are stage 3," or use stages as attainment levels. One answer depends on language, background knowledge, confidence, the story and the mood in the room. The same person can reason in different ways in different situations.
Give feedback on the quality of the reason: "You have named the rule. Now explain what the rule protects, and whether an exception could be fair."
If you assess, look at skills you can teach. Can learners give a reason, use evidence, describe another view fairly, tell a consequence from a principle and change their mind for a reason? Graphic organisers help here, because learners can record the people affected, the rules and the rights before they decide.
These revision notes bring together the three levels, six stages and main criticisms. The printable study note below helps you check key terms before an exam or a discussion.
Build an essay answer: explain the model, give a dilemma reason, describe the original research, then weigh a criticism against the evidence. Age trends, care, culture and the gap between judgement and action are useful checks.
Kohlberg's moral development. The theory describes reasoning, not personality or moral worth. It asks why someone judges an action right or wrong.
Preconventional reasoning focuses on punishment, reward and self-interest. Conventional reasoning focuses on approval, rules and social order. Postconventional reasoning focuses on rights, principles and justice that may go beyond a law or group opinion.
Use age-appropriate dilemmas and ask learners to explain why. Encourage respectful comparison, perspective-taking and evidence. Do not label learners by stage. Cultural fit, care and relationship-based reasoning, and the gap between reasoning and action are important limitations.
Memory cue: from consequences, to shared rules, to principles. The model describes how people reason about moral issues; it does not predict behaviour in every situation.
This short quiz tests whether you can recognise the reason behind a choice and distinguish the three levels and six stages. It also asks you to judge a claim about the evidence for the theory.
Choose one answer for each question, then open the explanation. If you miss one, compare the reasons rather than memorising a single keyword. These practice questions check your knowledge of the theory.
Which stage is being good to avoid punishment?
A. Stage 1. The reason is avoiding a sanction. Stage 2 focuses on a benefit or an exchange, while stage 4 focuses on a working system of rules.
Which stage is a part of conventional reasoning?
B. Stage 3. Conventional reasoning includes stages 3 and 4. Stage 3 centres on approval and relationships. Stage 4 centres on duties and social order.
A learner says, "I will help you if you help me later." Which stage best matches the reason?
A. Stage 2. The reason is an exchange of benefits. The offer to help alone tells you less than the reason for making it.
Someone supports changing an unfair law through fair public procedures. Which stage best matches that reason?
C. Stage 5. Laws are treated as shared agreements that can be changed to protect rights. Stage 4 puts the focus on keeping the social system working.
Two people both say Heinz should steal the medicine. What would you need to compare their reasoning?
B. Their reasons and answers to follow-up questions. The same choice can rest on fear, reward, loyalty, duty, rights or a principle. A full research assessment uses more than one brief reply.
Which statement best fits the research and criticisms?
C. Ordered change has support, while care, culture and action raise further questions. A strong revision answer gives both the model and the limits of the evidence.
These short answers cover common revision questions about the stages, their evidence and their use. The quiz above lets you practise identifying the reason behind an answer.
| Level | Stages |
|---|---|
| preconventional | (stages 1 and 2), |
| conventional | (stages 3 and 4) |
| and postconventional | (stages 5 and 6). |
Kohlberg later found stage 6 so rarely that he stopped scoring it.
Stage 1, the obedience and punishment stage. The reason for behaving well is to stay out of trouble. If the reason were to earn a reward or a favour in return, that would be stage 2.
Stage 6. A person who commits to principles such as social justice, equal rights and respect for the dignity of all people is reasoning at stage 6. Stage 5 also values rights, but it works through agreed laws and fair ways to change them.
No. Age brings more experience, so reasoning tends to change with it. But the stages describe kinds of reasons, not birthdays. Avoid charts that put every child of an age at one stage. Many adults reason at the conventional level, and one person can reason differently in different situations.
Stages 3 and 4 are both part of conventional reasoning. Stage 3 stresses approval and good relationships. Stage 4 stresses the duties and rules that keep a wider society working.
Kohlberg proposed a fixed order with no skipping, and his long-term study largely supported it. Later tests found some apparent regression and mixed answers. See the section on stage skipping and regression for the research, rather than drawing a conclusion from a few comments.
Use it to plan and guide discussion. Give a safe dilemma, ask for reasons, bring in other points of view, test rules and principles, and let learners think again. Judge how clear and consistent the reasons are. Never award a stage or use the model to explain misbehaviour.
There is no single one. Critics argue that strict stages overstate consistency and the top stages reflect a narrow Western idea of justice. Care gets too little weight, and good reasoning does not guarantee good behaviour.
Gilligan argued that it was, since the first sample was all boys and the scoring favoured justice over care. Later reviews found no consistent gap between males and females in stage scores (Walker, 1984). Differences in care and justice reasoning were small (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000).
No. Kohlberg scored the reason, not the yes or no. A person could back stealing for a stage 2 reason or oppose it for a stage 5 reason. The follow-up explanation shows the reasoning, and one reply is still not enough to judge a stage.
These sources support the claims in this article.